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omission in the simulation literature. This refers to the neglect of
potentialities of simulation as a scientific research technique enabling a
sophisticated and rigorous approach to analyzing &dquo;simulation models.&dquo; I
wished to point out that relatively too much effort has at times been
invested in the modeling stage, while neglecting simulation as a model
analysis technique. Thus, Schultz and Sullivan may disagree with my
definition and propose an alternative which may be more useful for their
purpose. (Although it seems that their five-point definition is not strictly
in line with Aristotle’s advice to definition makers.)
It seems that part of their misinterpreting my argument stems from
our different disciplinary backgrounds. I used the operations researcher’s
approach (see, for example, Hillier and Lieberman’s definition in their
&dquo;Introduction to Operations Research&dquo; [Holden Day, 1967] : &dquo;Simulation
typically is nothing more or less than the technique of performing
sampling experiments on the model of the system&dquo; [p. 4~0] ) which, I
believe, should be that of the social scientist as well. Hence, my implicit
assumption concerning experimentation with quantitative models, for
whose solution computer simulation is an appropriate technique. (Pencil
and paper or a desk calculator are other possibilities, but one would not
recommend them too often in this day and age.) Surely, if one deals with a
conceptual model, expressed in verbal terms or general symbols, some of
my remarks are presently irrelevant. In the latter case, the word
&dquo;simulation&dquo; assumes a different connotation, closer to Schultz and
Sullivan’s definition, in the same sense that a word such as &dquo;significance&dquo;
has a different meaning in statistical theory as compared to everyday
usage.
-Mordechai Shechter
Technion
Haifa, Israel
Comments on "Simulation and the City"
0 In the December 1970 issue of this journal (pp. 411-428), Berger,
Boulay, and Zisk have outlined some general difficulties which in their
opinion have slowed the development of simulation as a method for the
scientific study of urban society (p. 412). Although I accept, confimmed by
my personal experiences gained in the United States, the authors’
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conclusion of basic intellectual difficulties being responsible for this
situation (p. 413), I disagree with several of their interpretations. In my
view, some of their statements lead to an increase in the general confusion
and disagreement in this field instead of facilitating a reduction of it, and I
would like to reply to these authors with the following arguments:
(1) Presupposition for any simulation of an urban phenomenon or
process is its definition as a system, i.e. as a theoretical structure consisting
of elements (subsystems), relationships, and orders of action (rules).
(2) Depending on the kind of descriptiveness and determinativeness,
different approaches for the simulation of one-and-the-same system have
to be provided-e.g., an approach to investigate the unknown relationships
or orders of action between elements of an urban system (mainly those
between the social, cultural, or political elements and their ecotechnical
environment) will differ significantly from an approach that tries to derive
optimal solutions from a system completely determined.
(3) An excellent and, in my view, still valid description and determi-
nation of such different approaches is presented in an early RAND
publication by Geisler, Haythorn, and Steger (1962: 5-8; see also Steger,
1965). These authors define a continuum of systems analysis techniques
ranging from least to most abstract:
Increasing Degree of 
...
Abstraction and Formalization
(4) The three simulation techniques defined by the terms One-to-One
Simulation, Game Simulation, and All-Computer Simulation (p. 413. Ray
and Duke use the terms Gaming, Gaming Simulation, and Simulation; the
previous editor of this journal has employed the terms Man Simulation,
Man-Machine Simulation, and All-Machine Simulation [Inbar, 1970: 4] )
differ significantly in relation to the type of initial empirical bases, of
research approach and procedures, and of results obtainable. The often
cited statement of Abt that all games are simulations, but not all
simulations are games (p. 416) does not provide any further understanding
since it neglects completely the contribution of the formal &dquo;Theory of
Gwnes&dquo; to the techniques oaf all-computer simulation and mathematical
analysis.
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(5) Thus, turning to the argumentation of Berger et al. (pp. 414-415), I
would conclude:
There is an essential difference between the techniques described by
Ray and Duke, and the failure to recognize their identity and
efficiency has greatly contributed to the failure of simulation to
develop generally adoptable models of urban social forceS,2 and the
choice between these different simulation-types should only be
made on the basis of the relation between the objectives of an
analysis or design and the kind of initial empirical material
available.’
(6) These conclusions lead to an assumption of a principal interde-
pendence between the objectives, empirical bases, and techniques of =an
urban simulation approach, and thus to the request for the investigation of
efficient, if not optimal combinations of these three components. Such
kind of theoretical concept of a &dquo;general appropriateness&dquo; of urban
simulations could provide an important contribution for the still outstand-
ing comparison and evaluation of past and present activities, which in turn
prove to be in my view the inevitable presuppositions for any valid
contribution to this field in the future.
-Henning Schran
Technische Universit&auml;t
Berlin, Germany
NOTES
(1) Depending on the occasional ability to abstract and formalize the process
investigated, war games (p. 416) have always been based on these three different
simulation techniques: the gaming type ("free" game), the all-computer type ("rigid"
game), and the hybrid type of gaming simulation.
(2) An instructive example of this failure in the recognition of identity and
resulting confusion is presented in the same issue of this journal: the "Genealogy of
Urban Simulation Models" (p. 481) shows an assignment of several projects to the
sector "Games," which proves to be not valid in relation to the a.m. typology.
(3) This conclusion in no way neglects the influence that costs may have on this
decision. From a general theoretical view, however, this influence has to be seen as an
exogenous variable to the simulation approach, not as an endogenous one.
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A Reply to Dr. Schran:
. If we understand Mr. Schran correctly, he diverges from us on only one
important point: the usefulness of commonly accepted schemas for
classifying simulations.
In our assessment of developments in urban simulation (and, by
implication, simulation in social science generally) we took the position
that classificatory categories used to differentiate among different tech-
niques for simulating had taken on, perhaps more by default than by
design, epistemological status. We will still insist on this point. Granted,
simulation techniques may be placed on a continuum which reflects an
&dquo;increasing degree of abstraction and formalization.&dquo; The formality or
abstractness of a model does not affect the relationship between the
referent system and simulation findings. The kinds of knowledge produced
by each technique are directly comparable. We would even extend this
notion to purely deductive systems such as game theory since they are
relevant to social science concerns only as they are &dquo;applied.&dquo;
The structures and processes which social scientists investigate are
exactly as &dquo;simple&dquo; or &dquo;complex,&dquo; as &dquo;abstract&dquo; or &dquo;real&dquo; as are the
schemes we use to describe and explain them. Thus, a social choice payoff
function may be a very &dquo;simple&dquo; thing for a welfare economist, since the
behavior involved may be represented by a &dquo;simple&dquo; equation. The same
social choice behavior may be catastrophically &dquo;complex&dquo; for another
social scientist investigating such an event through, let us say, &dquo;gaming-
simulation.&dquo;
We must not let such differences in technique obscure the fact that it is
one and the same social process which is being modelled in the above
examples. The &dquo;real world&dquo; referents remain the same. The logic of
inquiry applies to both sorts of models in the same way. The results
